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bstract
hy do merger talks collapse? – an exploratory study about the contributing factors behind ‘wedding cold feet’ and deal making failures in Mergers
nd Acquisitions according to the perspective of active deal making professionals in Brazil. One basic question has encouraged the present study:
fter all the effort, expectations and money often invested in deal making, why are M&A transactions simply abandoned, even when the benefits
o the business, shareholders, customers and employees seem to be clear?
 2017 Departamento de Administrac¸a˜o, Faculdade de Economia, Administrac¸a˜o e Contabilidade da Universidade de Sa˜o Paulo – FEA/USP.
ublished by Elsevier Editora Ltda. This is an open access article under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
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esumo
or que as negociac¸ões de fusão entram em colapso – um estudo exploratório sobre os fatores por trás dos “pés frios de casamento” e fracassos
as negociac¸ões em fusões e aquisic¸ões a partir da perspectiva dos profissionais atuantes no negócio no Brasil. Uma pergunta básica incentivou
ste estudo: Após todo o esforc¸o, expectativas e dinheiro normalmente investidos em dealmaking, porque tantas transac¸ões são simplesmente
bandonadas, mesmo quando os benefícios são claros para a empresa, acionistas, clientes e funcionários?
 2017 Departamento de Administrac¸a˜o, Faculdade de Economia, Administrac¸a˜o e Contabilidade da Universidade de Sa˜o Paulo – FEA/USP.
ublicado por Elsevier Editora Ltda. Este e´ um artigo Open Access sob uma licenc¸a CC BY (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
esumenor qué las negociaciones de fusión colapsan – un estudio exploratorio sobre los factores que llevan al fracaso en fusiones y adquisiciones desde
a perspectiva de profesionales que actúan en Brasil. Una pregunta básica ha estimulado este estudio: después de todo el esfuerzo, expectativas∗ Corresponding author at: KPMG Strategy - Rua do Passeio, 38 - Setor 2 - 17◦ andar - Ed. Passeio Corporate.
E-mail: asales@kpmg.com.br (A.C. Sales).
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y dinero normalmente invertidos en dealmaking, ¿por qué tantas transacciones son simplemente abandonadas, incluso cuando los beneficios son
claros para la empresa, accionistas, clientes y empleados?
© 2017 Departamento de Administrac¸a˜o, Faculdade de Economia, Administrac¸a˜o e Contabilidade da Universidade de Sa˜o Paulo – FEA/USP.
Publicado por Elsevier Editora Ltda. Este es un artı´culo Open Access bajo la licencia CC BY (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
Palavras-chave: Fusões e aquisic¸ões; Diligência prévia; Impedimento de negócios; Fracasso em F&A
Palabras clave: Fusiones y adquisiciones; Diligencia previa; Impedimento de negocios; Fracaso en fusiones y adquisiciones
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Mergers and Acquisitions represent a ‘marriage’ between two
artners that are not often equal (Caldas & Tonelli, 2002; Coffey,
arrow, & Holbeche, 2002). In fact, the path that leads to this
marriage’ between two companies well resembles the typical
equence of events that brings a couple together. It all starts with
ome sort of flirting, then the relationship starts to evolve and
ets a bit more serious, which leads to a commitment level that
ventually ends up in marriage. Like any other marriage, M&A
lso has a day after, a honeymoon and, then, life goes on (or not).
f a merger can be illustrated through a marriage scene, then the
im of the current study is to understand why “brides” are left at
he altar, and which factors are behind the ‘wedding cold feet’
n mergers and acquisitions.
The M&A activity phenomenon is relatively well-studied by
cademics and practitioners within management environments.
hese studies have helped shedding light on issues such as the
lignment between deal making and strategy, critical success
actors in mergers and acquisitions, acquisition process man-
gement, due diligence conduction, as well as on valuations
nd post-deal integrations (Gomes, Angwin, Weber, & Yedidia
arba, 2013).
Other interesting topics include cultural impacts on M&A
eals and CEO’s overconfidence in M&A processes, besides
atters about why transactions fail to create value. However,
ery few attempts to study the “No-deal” phenomenon or the
easons why merger talks fail to reach the completion phase have
een made, i.e., the eventual signing of the sales and purchase
greement, which is often referred to as “SPA”.
One basic question has encouraged the conduction of the
resent study: why are M&A transactions simply abandoned
fter all the efforts, expectations and money invested in deal
aking, even when the benefits to the business, shareholders,
ustomers and employees (acquisition of resources or supplies,
ertical integration, market entry, tax incentives, knowledge
bout other companies, technological expertise, among others)
eem to be clear? Overall, stakeholders have different points of
iew and that is why the current exploratory study was focused
n assessing the factors contributing to deal making failures
ccording to the perspective of active deal making professionals
n Brazil.
Thus, the aims of the present study were to identify what
akes transactions fail midway, to better understand why com-
anies analyze M&A transactions, get involved in negative
ctions and give up the negotiation afterwards, as well as
u
t
Bo identify the causes for such failures and their undelaying
otives.
The current study was structured as follows: first, the the-
retical background is presented and discussed along with the
&A process and its phases; the second section refers to the
dopted research method. The third section concerns data anal-
sis and discussions about the herein found results. Finally, the
ast section presents the main conclusions.
iterature  review
Mergers and acquisitions are corporate strategies that have
een helping to foster corporate growth; moreover, produc-
ivity and operational excellence also represent important
rofit drivers. However, other actions are necessary to main-
ain competitive advantage in environments where executives
re pressured to generate increasing revenues (Porter, 1985).
rganic activities (internal development) tend to offer limited
rowth opportunities, fact that forces companies to seek inor-
anic growth strategies, mainly mergers, acquisitions and joint
entures, i.e., growth resulting from mergers or takeovers, rather
han from increased business activity in the company (Carnevalli
ilho, 2000).
In order to meet the aims of the current study, the terms
Mergers and Acquisitions”, “M&A”, “Transaction”, “Deal” or
Merger” will be used in an interchangeable manner to denote
ny combination between two or more companies in order to
bsorb, merge and combine the assets and liabilities of a com-
any into those of a buying firm or new entity. In addition, it is
ecessary knowing the M&A motives and processes as a way to
urther understand the No-deal phenomenon in order to possibly
dentify the reasons why merger talks collapse, even when they
resent the potential to significantly create value and seem to be
heoretically logical.
There are numerous reasons to pursue a transaction since
cquisitions are often at the center of any debate about expan-
ion strategies. Mergers and acquisitions are justified by several
easons and they should comply with the companies’ strategic
lans on a case-to-case basis.
The different reasons to chase acquisition targets were
xplained by Hubbard (2013), who listed analogous or com-
lementary reasons to start M&A talks, namely: resource
cquisition, vertical integration, market entry, client’s follow
p, gain with economies of scale, market share enhancement,
ax incentives, and competitive differentiation. Vermeulen and
arkema (2001) found that ongoing acquisitions might broaden
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 company’s knowledge and decrease its inertia, which are valu-
ble reasons to enter an M&A deal.
Jensen (1982) identified another set of reasons, which
ncludes the access to resources or supplies, technological exper-
ise, the acquisition of talents, geographical expansion, new
roducts, and diversification. Porter (1980) goes beyond the typ-
cal motivations for value-creation acquisitions, and addresses
he irrational desire to pursue a target attributable to manage-
ent idiosyncrasies. In other words, vanity, eccentricity and
he need of showing power are part of motivations driven by
alue-creation acquisitions.
Alam, Khan, and Zafar (2014) conclude that the basic concept
ehind transaction processes lies on the fundamental assump-
ion that two companies together are more valuable than the
um of their values in separate. Haspeslagh and Jemison (1990)
hare the same opinion, they believe that the essential task in
ny acquisition process lies on creating value by merging two
rganizations. These authors explain that value created through
erging is unique and that such value creation would not be
ossible if the companies were operated in separate. Thus, they
orroborate the idea that the analysis, negotiation and internal
elling of an acquisition nominee and the offered ultimate pre-
ium are based on the main idea of value creation through
usiness combinations.
The M&A process can be divided in three stages (pre deal,
n-going deal and post deal), which are based on seven clear
orkflows. The following paragraphs are an attempt to link these
hree transaction stages to the wedding metaphor.
The pre deal or flirting phase has two moments. First, Gole
nd Hilger (2009) state that strategy formulation is a central
&A tenet, because this practice is better than the investment
trategy; therefore, acquisitions should be guided and driven
y significant strategic planning. Executives need to address
he advantages and disadvantages of organic versus inorganic
rowth (“buy” or “build” analysis) throughout the strategic
eview. A central question lies on whether the organization has
he capability to develop the desired competences internally, as
ell as on the required cost, time and effort. After reasoning
bout such matters, executives shall analyze the possibility of
uying these competences in the market.
Cullinan and Holland (2002) reinforce the assumption that
ignificant strategic planning should drive acquisition processes.
hey believe that the chance to achieve transactional success
ncreases dramatically when the target business of the company
omplies with the buyer’s strategic goals. According to Hubbard
2013), pre-acquisition planning is a key factor to the acquisition
rocess. He states that without proper planning the acquirer is
t risk, since the information available to support the negotia-
ions with the target company is limited; therefore, it could limit
ynergy and jeopardize the due diligence process. According to
his author, the understanding about the vision and the planning
o go forward are essential to gain and keep the acceptance and
he enthusiasm of target employees.Howson (2003) states that only after doing a proper strategic
eview it is reasonable identifying and approaching an acquisi-
ion target. A target screening exercise should begin by setting
he goals and aims of the M&A. According to Jensen (1982),
t
t
r
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any companies act prematurely and begin looking for deals
ithout first considering the company that would best meet their
trategic goals.
Jensen (1982) lists five target screening and approaching pro-
ess phases, namely: (a) defining objectives and ranking the most
mportant strategic benefits; (b) establishing criteria, measures
nd attributes of the target company; (c) identifying nominees
n public and private databases, based on market research; (d)
athering information; and (e) contacting prospects.
According to Howson (2003), if an approach leads to mutual
nterest, both parts will look forward to starting serious negotia-
ions. If there is good match between the parts, the due diligence
rocess can get started. Accordingly, the second phase of the
&A process, which also includes a due diligence, starts while
he dealing process is still going. At this point, the two compa-
ies agree on getting to know each other better and on sharing
ritical and strategic information concerning financial, commer-
ial, operational, personnel, legal and tax aspects. As explained
y Bing (1996), this phase often takes place after the parts
nvolved in the deal decide that it is feasible and after they get to
 preliminary understanding (or to what appears to be reachable
nderstanding); however, at this point the binding contract was
ot signed yet.
Howson (2003) states that a successful due diligence leads
o negotiation rounds and, if such negotiations go well, the deal
s set. Bing (1996) lists topics to be covered during the due dili-
ence process, but he does not define the field this diligence
ts into. The topics include Capital structure and Ownership,
roducts and Services, R&D and Technology, Competition and
ustomers, Marketing, Pricing, Advertising and PR, Manu-
acturing, Purchasing, HR, Corporate Culture, Budgeting and
lanning, Debt and Banking, Investments and Cash Manage-
ent, Taxes, among others.
Drastic consequences can come from unsuccessful due dili-
ences, from overlooking critical areas and, particularly, from
on-financial matters. According to Bing (1996), financial state-
ents provide thumbnail sketches of a business and of its
ackground, as well as give few clues and trigger insights about
he company in the present-term, and enable reasonable guessing
bout its near future.
Valuation is also an important point throughout the dealing
rocess. Wilde (2014) defines as cynical a person who makes the
istinction between value and price, i.e., a person who knows
he price of everything and the value of nothing. According to
amodaran (2011), such profile would fit many investors who
ee investing as a game and define winning as staying “ahead of
he pack”.
The deal often goes on when the valuation process depicts a
in-win situation for both the acquirer and the seller (Gole &
ilger, 2009). According to the acquirer, in the buyer’s view-
oint, the combined value of the acquired business exceeds the
urchase price; on the other hand, in the seller’s viewpoint, the
rice paid is more important than other alternatives, including
he continuous ownership of the stand-alone business. Valua-
ion issues able to derail a transaction emerge when the acquirer
ealizes that such transaction would unlikely destroy the value
Gole & Hilger, 2009).
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Fig. 1. The deal cycle.
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Naturally, negotiations start at the beginning of the process
e.g. when the counterpart is approached) and keep on going until
he transaction is closed. The critical stage during the negotiation
rocess is felt right after the due diligence, when the informa-
ion gathered during it is added to and factored in the valuation
odel. Such compilation is conducted in order to determine the
ombined value of the acquisition (Gole & Hilger, 2009). A
igher premium must be paid if the value predicted for the tar-
et company is lower than it was previously thought, fact that
ould lead to the renegotiation of transaction terms.
Closing the deal means signing the Sales and Purchase Agree-
ent (“SPA”), and it can be compared to saying “yes” in a
edding ceremony; there is no way back after the deal is closed
nd the merger is complete. Then, it is time to celebrate and start
he integration and consolidation process. Integration regards the
ransition period, when the merged entity is designed and set.
ften, a lot of effort and planning is demanded to accomplish
 smooth integration, which involves people, assets, customers,
uppliers, technologies, infrastructure and operations (Epstein,
004). Consolidation follows the integration process; it is the
rocess when the new entity is already set to work and accom-
lish the plan, which was the basis for the merger rationale.
ethodological  strategy
The current study follows an exploratory qualitative research
esign. According to Chizzotti (1995), exploratory studies often
larify situations in order to raise the awareness about them.
his research method was chosen because it offers specialized
echniques for information gathering (Bauer & Gaskel, 2003).
uch information result in rich and substantial descriptions of
he herein studied phenomenon (Vieira, 2004).
Merger talks collapse due to a number of objective and sub-
ective reasons. This type of information is often confidential
nd treated with a lot of discretion. The qualitative approach
as chosen, because the reasons for a failure are not often dis-
losed. According to Neves (1996), this approach comprises a
et of different interpretative techniques that aim at describing
nd decoding the components of a complex system of meanings.
The qualitative approach was applied to extract executives’
mpressions about- and experiences with promising M&A talks
hat have collapsed. The statement by Malhotra (2006) about
he sampling technique, which was developed for qualitative
esearch purposes and to select the participants to be consid-
red, addresses it as a non-probabilistic technique, since it relies
n personal judgments about the researcher rather than on the
ossibility of selecting sample elements.
Moreover, data were collected between March and June 2014
hrough 16 in-depth interviews with deal makers from different
ackgrounds, including corporate and private equity profession-
ls, advisors and investment bankers. Sixteen (16) interviewees
ere intentionally chosen depending on their experience and on
he role they played in the transaction processes; their availability
nd interview accessibility were taken into account.
The aim was to investigate the entire deal flow and to
nderstand the correlation between different dialogs, as well
s between different viewpoints. The sample was firstly divided
t
s
i
sSource: the authors.
n five categories of professionals in order to make it easier to
ach participant to contribute to the research (Fig. 1):
. Strategy and Business Development “BD” professionals are
often brought in before the deal takes shape and put in direct
contact with the top management, either if the deal is consid-
ered to be made or not. Strategy and Business Development
professionals often participate in the process before, during
and, sometimes, after the deal is made.
. Deal Management professionals are individuals hired to coor-
dinate the M&A process, as well as to negotiate, value and
close the deal. They are often responsible for the target (or
investor) approach, for liaising with the valuation teams and
attorneys in charge of drafting the SPA, during the due dili-
gence.
. Due Diligence professionals control the transaction evalua-
tion (aka due diligence) process.
. Legal Advisors are responsible for drafting the SPA and per-
forming a legal due diligence.
. Integration professionals are consultants hired to conduct the
Post Deal Integration work. These professionals are often
brought in during the due diligence phase.
nterviewee  classiﬁcation
The sample was divided into (A) Advisor and (B)
uyer/Seller based on other aspects in order to simplify the pro-
ess. Sample categorization results can be seen in Table 1, which
resents the following information: the role a person plays in the
egotiation, this person’s focus on the transaction, the total num-
er of transactions this person has participated in, the number of
ailed transactions (non-deal) this person has participated in, and
he person’s level of involvement. The names of the participants
ere omitted for confidentiality reasons, to give them neutral
dentification (column identification).
Overall, the interviewer was aware of the interviewees’
eneral willingness to cooperate, mainly because of the way
he interviews were conducted. It seems that the ideal inter-
iew recommended by Lodi (1991) was accomplished, i.e.,
he interviewee raised the favorable and unfavorable rea-
ons to participate in the interview. Some favorable reasons
ncluded altruism, and the pursuit of emotional and intellectual
atisfaction.
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Table 1
Sample categories.
# ID Role Focus Transaction experience Involvement level
Total transactions Non-deal
1 A1 Advisor Strategy/BD 11+ 11+ High
2 A2 Advisor Strategy/BD 11+ 11+ High
3 A3 Advisor Deal Management 11+ 11+ High
4 A4 Advisor Deal Management 11+ 11+ High
5 A5 Advisor Due Diligence 11+ 11+ High
6 A6 Advisor Due Diligence 11+ 11+ High
7 A7 Advisor Due Diligence 11+ 11+ High
8 A8 Advisor Legal 11+ 11+ High
9 A9 Advisor Integration 11+ 3–5 High
10 A10 Advisor Integration 11+ 11+ High
11 B1 Buyer/Seller Strategy/BD 6–10 6–10 High
12 B2 Buyer/Seller Deal Management 6–10 1–2 High
13 B3 Buyer/Seller Deal Management 11+ 11+ High
14 B4 Buyer/Seller Due Diligence 3–5 3–5 High
15 B5 Buyer/Seller Due Diligence 3–5 1–2 High
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pen  questionnaire
The questions, which were relatively open, were placed
ccording to the interviewee’s profile, personal experience and
illingness to share. However, a free script comprising rele-
ant questions about the subject was used as guide during the
nterviews in order to contextualize the investigated topic and
o better understand the respondent’s relation with the M&A
rocess, for example:
1) What is the role you play in the transaction process?
2) How many transactions have you participated in?
3) How many transactions have you seen abandoned?
4) How active was your participation in these processes?
5) Based on your personal experience, what are the factors
leading to the abandonment of a transaction? Think about
an emblematic transaction you have participated in, but that
was actually not completed. What were the contributing fac-
tors leading one or both parts away from the deal? Is there
a price to be paid for walking away from a deal? Please
comment.
6) Finally, have you witnessed transactions that were not sup-
posed to be completed, transactions that, despite the ‘cold
feet’ or hesitation of one part of or both parts, ended up
going all the way to the end? What were the consequences
of it? Please comment.
ata  analysis
A content analysis was conducted in order to treat the
ollected information. It is an extremely useful analysis tech-
ique, especially for qualitative research emphasizing the need
f systematizing testimonies and relying on language studies
Dellagnello & Silva, 2005). According to Gill (2003), there
s no single perspective on content analysis, but a number of
ifferent analysis types.
t
r
v3–5 11+ High
The narratives were transcribed in the pre-analysis stage and,
ubsequently, assessed and organized according to factors that
ave led to the abandonment of the transaction process. At the
nd, based on the collected information, data were interpreted in
rder to find the link between elements in the narrative and the
imultaneous presence of two or more elements in a testimony.
Although the very nature of the exploratory design does not
llow formulating hypotheses a  priori  (Vergara, 2000), there
s consensus that it is possible generating new assumptions by
nalyzing the collected testimonies. Such assumptions may be
seful to future research and studies on the topic, as well as to
elp developing knowledge on business management, mainly in
he Merger and Acquisition field.
The gathered information mostly consisted of recollecting
nd interpreting the interviewees, who are a group of active pro-
essionals who have valuable insights, as well as vast experience
n- and knowledge about deal making. It is important mention-
ng that these professionals could have introduced biases and
ubjective elements from their personal involvement with the
tudied subject, the so-called “No-deal” phenomenon. Addi-
ionally, a diversified sample may cover important trends and
ndings if the study is performed according to a particular subset
f participants.
esearch  results
The current section presents the analysis applied to the per-
ormed interviews, as well as the collected information, the
ey findings and interpretations. Data interpretation focused on
actors that have contributed to merger talk collapses. Intervie-
ees were very collaborative, and the data collected during the
nterviews were filtered, so that only information relevant to
he present study was used. It was done in order not to disturb
eader’s understanding.
Data were presented according to the logical order of the con-
ersations: typical roles played during a transaction, the usual
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eal flow; when the merger talks could collapse during the nego-
iation, common factors contributing to merger talk collapses,
he price paid for walking away from a deal, and other consid-
rations.
What are the typical roles played in M&A processes?
The interview results corroborated the belief that the roles
layed during transactions have close link to the part profession-
ls are playing (e.g. buyer, seller, advisor), to their contribution
o the deal evaluation (e.g. strategy, due diligence, valuation)
nd to different stages of the transaction process (e.g. pre-deal,
n-going deal, post-deal).
The main actors within the deal-making process are (a) the
Buyer” or “Investor”, who is the one paying for the stake in a
usiness by acquiring shares or assets from other company; and
b) the “Seller” or “Target”, who is the part selling a stake in a
usiness by divesting shares or assets to another company.
The buyer and seller characters in a so-called merge of equals
ay not be very clear or easy to identify. There are times when
hese characters may not even be present at all, if the newly
erged company keeps a 50/50 shareholding structure, since
his system gives no special powers or benefits to any of the
arts.
Buyers and Sellers can be grouped according to their nature;
hey can be of corporate or private equity nature and include pub-
ic (listed companies) and private companies. On the other hand,
rivate equity parts are often composed of investment compa-
ies dedicated to invest in operating companies. These equity
ompanies make their living by acquiring, fixing and selling
usiness.
Finally, depending on the origin of the capital, Buyers and
ellers can be classified as domestic (Brazilian) and foreign
ompanies. Interviewees also approached companies based on
he type of capital: family-owned, public (listed) companies,
ultinationals and state-controlled entities.
It is worth emphasizing that governments and state-owned
ompanies can make acquisitions in the market. According to
he interviewees, the reason for governments and state-owned
ompanies to engage in business deals demands a reasonable
evel of political interest.
Advisors support buyers and sellers in searching for-, assess-
ng and managing a deal. They often work side by side with
xecutives in mixed teams or in functions supporting decision
akers. Depending on the size and complexity of the transaction,
he number of advisors can be larger.
The action perimeter of advisors can vary, but the scope of
heir typical work can be set according to the stages of the deal.
(a) Stage 1: Pre-deal advisory. Buyers and sellers evaluate the
pportunities to invest in a certain market or divest a business
uring the pre-deal phase. At this point, it is not rare to have
EOs, CFOs and Boards searching for an external opinion to
evelop or validate the strategy formulation process.
(b) Stage 2: Deal advisory. It starts by identifying acquisition
argets or potential investors to invest in a company. Buyers and
ellers can use advisory support to manage the deal, because
hese advisors are negotiation and project management experts.
he deal manager coordinates other advisors and internal teams
n charge of closing the best deal possible. Remuneration is basedministração 52 (2017) 467–478
n success rates, and on the role played by specialized financial
dvisory firms, M&A boutiques and investment bankers.
The due diligence, as well as valuation and the drafting
f key deal documents, including understanding memos, offer
etters and SPAs, are activities performed during the dealing
rocess.
(c) Stage 3: Post deal advisory. Consultancy focused on
lanning and accomplishing a smooth integration process by
reparing the merging companies from Day 1 on. The consul-
ants also calculate and validate synergies, besides integrating
eams; a number of consulting works can be used to support the
ewly merged entity during the post deal phase.
How does the deal usually flow?
Interviewees confirmed the deal flow previously discussed in
he literature review. They explained that, some of the phases
end to run concomitantly; therefore, in practical terms, there is
ome degree of flexibility in the way things are done. They also
orroborated the assumption that merger talks tend to collapse
hen companies start to get to know each other in detail. This
esult meets the ‘flirting, engagement and wedding’ analogy,
ince it is similar to what happens to engaged couples. The more
ou know the other one, the more susceptible you are to see
eyond the first impression.
The following deal flow was based on contribution from the
iterature and on the interview program (Fig. 2):
Is it possible determining when a merger talk often collapses?
Not all M&A processes get to a successful conclusion,
ecause of the negative perception that the opportunity for poten-
ial value creation does not compensate the merging costs when
he parts become more and more familiar with one another; thus,
ne or both parts decide to abort the negotiations and walk away
rom the deal. According to the business jargon, the so-called
Deal breaker” consists of unresolved issues that come up dur-
ng the negotiation process and that may cause one or more parts
o walk away from the deal.
According to the interviews, merger talks often collapse
etween the deal validation and structuring stages, mainly during
r right after the due diligence.
“It’s at  the  due  diligence  that  information  is  exchanged  and
that the  skeletons  in  the  closet  can  be  unveiled” (A4, Advisor,
Deal management)
“All relevant  issues  raised  during  the  due  diligence  exercise
will impact  the  valuation  [purchase  price],  terms  and  condi-
tions of  the  deal  to  be  closed,  as  well  as  the  structure  of  the
deal. Sometimes,  the  risks  are  so  high  that  they  surpass  the
price to  be  paid  by  the  target,  thus  destroying  the  deal”. (A3,
Advisor, Deal management)
“It’s  during  the  due  diligence  that  deal  breakers  arise”. (B3,
Buyer/Seller, Due diligence)
“A risk  revealed  during  the  due  diligence  phase  may  be
manageable with  proper  deal  structuring.  Depending  on  the
situation,  certain  measures  can  be  adopted  to  try  shielding
the merged  entity  or  ‘newco’.  This  is particularly  valid  for
tax, labor  and  legal  risks.  Advisors  bring  their  market  expe-
rience to  design  mechanisms  to  mitigate  the  risks,  without
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eliminating  them,  but  by  bringing  a  better  level  of  comfort  to
the involved  parts.” (A8, Advisor, Legal)
“In  certain  cases,  the  deal  structure  proposed  by  the  sellers
need to  be  negotiated.  Sometime  the  transaction  falls  apart
because  of  lack  of  ﬂexibility  between  the  parts.  Obviously,  it
all involves  the  cash  to  be  paid  or  received  and  the  respective
timing of  cashing  it.” (B3, Buyer/Seller, Deal management)
What are the common factors contributing to merger talk
ollapses?
It is possible classifying deal breakers in two categories –
ualitative and quantitative – by analyzing the interview pro-
ram results. Qualitative issues are difficult to be expressed in
umbers, but they can represent a real threat to the deal, to the
cquirer or to the newly merged entity. The quantitative issues
an be translated into numbers, as well as factored through pur-
hase price, valuation model adjustments and/or through the
ormalization of the multiples.
As it can be seen in Table 2, although a number of issues were
eported, priority was given to the six main topics, namely: (1)
indow dressing; (2) unrealistic expectations concerning busi-
ess valuation; (3) tax-related risks, aggressive tax planning and
ver engineered schemes; (4) lack of information during the due
iligence exercise; (5) interpretation disputes and failure on get-
ing to an agreement due to the adjustments proposed for the
ue diligence; (6) general lack of governance, informalities and
uestionable corporate practices; which were acknowledged for
aving great influence on deal collapses.
indow  dressing
According to the interviewees, it is not rare that many target
ompanies make questionable adjustments to the financial state-
ents and management reports during the preparation of a salesrocess in order to draw the most optimistic picture possible
o potential buyers. Such reports and statements can jeopardize
redibility and eventually lead the merger talks to collapse. flow.
uthors.
“Numbers  that  have  no  proper  support  predictions  and  based
on wishful  thinking,  hidden  issues  brought  to  light  during  the
due diligence  process  or  the  non-disclosure  of  material  items
at the  appropriate  time  are  typical  manifestations  of  window
dressings in  transactions.  It  obviously  impacts  trust,  which
is fundamental  for  any  type  of  negotiation,  particularly  in
M&A” (A7, Advisor, Due diligence)
nrealistic  expectations  regarding  business  valuation
Different expectations concerning the value of the business
bout to be sold or merged were the second most common issues
eported by interviewees.
“It  is  normal  to  see  gaps  between  the  expectations  of  sellers
and buyers.  The  more  sophisticated  the  seller,  less  dissonance
will be  seen  in  the  negotiation.  For  example,  I have  seen  cases
wherein  sellers  do  not  have  a  clear  idea  of  what  a  discount
cash ﬂow  is  and  about  what  they  have  in  mind  in  a  multiple
thrown in  the  air  by  some  amateur  advisor.  It  creates  a  lot  of
confusion  and  at  the  end,  we  have  to  try  educating  the  seller
on how  to  proper  value  a  business.  The  problem  is  that  when
the seller  has  a  number  in  mind  it is  difﬁcult  to  override  it.”
(B1, Buyer/Seller, Strategy/BD)
ax-related  risks
The taxation environment in Brazil is complex, it is often
hanging and the burden is one of the highest in the world.
ccording to the interviewees, it is not rare to see Brazilian
ompanies, particularly family-owned business and mid-sized
ompanies, trying to reduce the burden.
“Tax complexity  is  signiﬁcant  and  it  can  be  a  deal  breaker.
Different interpretations  of  complex  rules,  and  the  fact  that
there is  no  tax  clearance,  increase  the  level  of  uncertainty
in negotiations.  Challengeable  tax  incentives,  aggressive  tax
planning and  creative  schemes  to  reduce  tax  burden  can  have
direct  impact  on  risk  perception  and,  consequently,  on  the
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Table 2
Qualitative × Quantitative issues.
Qualitative (“soft”) issues Quantitative (“valuation”) issues
Lack of information Unrealistic expectations about the future of the business and its value
Informalities, lack of governance and questionable corporate
practices
Tax-related risks, aggressive tax planning and over engineered schemes
Window dressing, hidden issues brought to light during the due
diligence process or the non-disclosure of material items at
the appropriate time
Failure on getting to an agreement concerning the adjustments
proposed for the due diligence
Cultural differences and incompatibility of personalities Quality of earnings and profitability
Deal fatigue due to the length of negotiations Overvalued assets
Untied lose-ends and inconsistencies through the process Other contingencies and hidden liabilities
Lack of conviction to close the deal Resistance to share transaction risks
Unexpected departure of key executives and personnel
Integration risks
Lack of professionalism
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ote: The six mostly recurring issues are highlighted.
valuation  of  the  company  to be  acquired” (B5, Buyer/Seller,
Due diligence)
“Tax evasion  is  more  difﬁcult  to  be  achieved  in  the  new  tax
electronic  systems  in  place  (e.g.  SPED),  but  it  is  still  out
there” (A6, Advisor, Due diligence)
ack  of  information  (or  preparation)
“There  is  nothing  more  frustrating  for  us  than  signing  a non-
binding offer,  kicking-off  the  due  diligence  and  realizing  that
the target  company  is  not  prepared  for  the  deal.  There  was  this
particular  transaction  where  the  information  was  so  scarce
that we  had  to  hire  an  accounting  ﬁrm  to  reconstruct  the
target company  accounting  and  to  gather  information  for
us, so  we  could  analyze  and  evaluate  the  business  opportu-
nity. Sellers  were  managing  the  business  on  a  cash  basis  and
had very  little  structured  ﬁnancial  information  to  share.  This
transaction  was  painful.  We  tried  very  hard  because  it  was
an interesting  asset  in  a  geography  that  was  key  for  us  to
expand into.  .  .  but  after  months  digging  the  scarce  informa-
tion available  we  decided  to  walk  away.” (B1, Buyer/Seller,
Strategy/BD)
ailure  to  get  to  an  agreement  on  the  adjustments  proposed
or the  due  diligence
At the end of the due diligence period, buyer and seller get
ogether to discuss the key due diligence issues and the respective
mpacts of it on the negotiation and valuation of the acquisition
arget company, as well as to discuss the mechanisms to mitigate
isks identified throughout the process.
“During the  ﬁnancial  due  diligence,  we  tend  to  focus  on  assets
that could  be  overstated  or  that  are  at  risk  of  realization,
on unrecorded  liabilities  or  on  hidden  contingencies,  work-
ing capital  trends,  CAPEX  trends.  On  the  income  statements
side, we  investigate  the  quality  of  earnings,  non-recurring
items impacting  EBTIDA,  related  part  transactions,  pro-
visions, allocations,  capitalization  of  expenses  and  cut-offissues.  The  due  diligence  report  includes  a summary  of  all
identiﬁed  adjustments  that  will  feed  the  valuation  model  and
price negotiations.  Obviously,  there  are  cases  where  seller’s
risk perception  is  very  different  than  that  of  the  buyers  and  it
creates an  impasse,  sometimes,  difﬁcult  to  reconcile.  . . and
the deal  collapses.” (A5, Advisor, Due diligence).
“Due diligence  exercises  in  Brazil  often  identify  more  issues
and risks  than  investors  in  developed  markets  may  be  used
to, particularly  in  tax  and  labor  spaces.” (A7, Advisor, Due
diligence)
eneral  lack  of  governance,  informalities  and  questionable
orporate practices
According to the interviewees, questionable practices, infor-
ality and lack of governance were some of the main factors
ontributing to merger talk collapses. A seasoned due diligence
dvisor has well-summarized the feelings shared by most inter-
iewees:
“By talking  about  deal  making  in  Brazil,  I understand  that
there are  cases  that  may  lead  to  the  abandonment  of  a trans-
action due  to  qualitative  issues,  particularly  those  involving
reckless management;  fraudulent  and  criminal  acts  clearly
contrary to  the  laws  that  can  have  weight  in  the  decision.
Still, this  decision  depends  on  the  type  of  investor  and  on  the
objectives  of  the  transaction.  Institutional  investors  (PE’s,
Investment Funds  and  the  like)  are  more  reluctant  to  treat
such issues  as  listed  above.  However,  Brazilian  strategic
investors may  have  a  more  complacent  view  (in  the  sense  of
being able  to resolve  the  situation  in  the  ‘post-acquisition’)
due to  the  need  of  acquiring  the  asset  (or  entity,  or  tech-
nological knowledge,  or  withdraw  a  potential  competitor).
The price  drop  is  also  related  to  the  type  of  investor.  Funds
and PEs  may  present  the  gains  (at  short  and  medium  terms)
that could  be  assessed,  given  that  the  potential  of  the  tar-
get company  was  not  acquired.  Strategic  buyers  may  face  a
future major  competitor,  or  fail  to  acquire  certain  knowl-
edge or  technology  that  could  lead  to  increased  revenue
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levels,  EBITDA  and  market  share.  In  general,  the  most  visible
consequences  at  ﬁrst  are  issues  involving  litigation  and  con-
tingencies  (materialized  and  not  materialized)  that  arise  from
tax, and  tax  and  labor  issues.  However,  concerning  frauds,
acts and  conducts  contrary  to  the  law  also  become  possible
future problems.  Having  said  that,  I  perceive  a  clear  dis-
tinction between  Brazilians  and  foreign  investors:  local  deal
makers are  more  complacent  and  tolerant  to  ethical  issues.
U.S., European  and  Japanese  investors  are  very  concerned
with reputational  risks  and  with  the  FCPA  type  of  issues.”
(A7, Advisor, Due diligence)
Another interviewee confirmed:
“I witnessed  Brazilian  strategic  investors  who,  with  the  sup-
port of  a large  ﬁnancial  institution  that  has  entirely  ﬁnanced
the deal,  did  not  care  for  the  numerous  indications  of  ﬁnan-
cial and  accounting  misconduct  (some  of  those  confessed
in written  by  sellers),  acts  contrary  to  the  laws  (including
bribery of  government  ofﬁcials),  and  the  consequent  exposure
of the  target  company.  The  transaction  was  completed,  the
buyer worked  to  adjust  the  internal  practices  of  the  acquired
company and  managed  all  contingencies  and  risks  identi-
ﬁed during  the  due  diligence.  Sales  price,  form  of  payment
and the  terms  of  the  acquisition  were  also  adjusted  dur-
ing the  closing,  so  that  the  buyer  could  mitigate  some  risks
and get  some  protections  against  possible  future  risks.  That
included  getting  the  formal  commitment  of  former  owners
to respond  to any  risks  and  exposures  (including  the  pay-
ment of  ﬁnes,  debts,  costs  and  court  and  attorney’s  fees
when applicable).  In  some  cases,  the  mechanism  of  ‘escrow
account’ was  used.  (.  . .)  “Based  on  my  experience,  this  is
the type  of  negotiation  that  only  a  buyer  well  versed  in  doing
business in  Brazil  can  achieve.  Sophisticated  buyers,  par-
ticularly  international  ﬁrms,  have  difﬁculties  to  live  with
and manage  that  kind  of  risk,  particularly  if  they  origi-
nated from  questionable  corporate  practices.” (A9, Advisor,
Integration)
Brazilian companies are becoming increasingly aware of
ecent anti-corruption and anti-bribery laws in Brazil. The new
ules are similar to the US FCPA and UK Bribery act. A num-
er of small and mid-sized companies will soon need to adapt
ecause they still make use of non-orthodox practices to avoid
ureaucracy and reduce tax burden. Nowadays, these compa-
ies rarely engage top reputable accounting firms to audit their
nancial statements.
Is there a price for walking away from a deal?
The collapse of a merger talk can trigger frustration feelings in
he involved parts, particularly in those emotionally connected to
he deal. However, when the due diligence unveils a high degree
f uncertainty, risks beyond the acceptable levels or a purchase
rice that is difficult to achieve in the future, the best decision
o make is to walk away.
Accordingly, a Brazilian deal maker quoted:“Get  to  know  your  walk  away  number”. (A4, Advisor, Deal
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However, walking away from a deal is not that obvious, Gole
nd Hilger (2009) explain that acquisition transactions take on a
ife of their own, individuals and organizations become com-
itted to them, and such commitment is expressed through
angerous enthusiastic support, optimistic expectations and
road-based company involvement. Many of the forces at work
ould mitigate the ‘pulling the plug’ effect during the transac-
ion and any attempt to keep on justifying the transaction is often
 triumph of hope over good judgment, thus it should be strongly
voided.
This contrary force pushing to deal completion is a behav-
or commonly referred to as “deal fever”, a mindset not rarely
anifested in the M&A process, which is featured by overcon-
dence and “high testosterone levels”. As suggested by Bing
1996), investors’ enthusiasm with the business can be so great
t clouds their sight. He goes further and makes a distinction
etween the time the business has been coveted for- and if this
ime represents a key component in a strategic plan. Therefore,
reat irrational enthusiasm impairs objectiveness.
The same view is shared by a large number of interviewees:
“You don’t  want  ‘deal  fever’  to  blind  your  objectivity  or
hijack your  reason.  Consequences  can  be  disastrous.” (B1,
Buyer/Seller, Deal Management)
The next case shows a foreign investor doing what was nec-
ssary to close the transaction, a typical case of ‘deal fever’ as
escribed in the interview:
“Again,  family-owned  businesses  are  complicated.  I  was
working for  this  client  [buyer]  for  two  years  trying  to  crack
a deal  with  this  promising  business.  The  main  driver  was
the potential  of  the  Oil  &  Gas  industry  in  Brazil.  The  target
had a very  optimistic  view  about  the  future  of  the  business.  It
was in  2009–2010  and  the  potential  of  Pre-Salt  discoveries
were blinding  everybody  involved  in  the  deal.  Aside  from  the
problems  to  validate  the  forecast  assumptions,  sellers  were
not very  sophisticated  and  it  took  almost  one  year  to  com-
plete the  due  diligence.  No  proper  ﬁnancial  reporting  was  in
place and,  despite  its  size,  the  company  was  managed  on a
cash basis.  It  was  no  deal  for  amateurs.  There  were  all  pos-
sible complications  including  ex-wife,  broken  relationships
with sons  of  the  ﬁrst  marriage,  and  three  advisors  trying  to
manage the  deal  on  behalf  of  the  founder  of  the  business
and selling  part  (!).  . .  The  length  of  the  negotiations  almost
killed the  deal,  but  the  buyers  were  in  the  ‘deal  fever’  mode
and there  was  a  mandate  from  HQ  to  close  the  deal.” (A5,
Advisor, Due diligence)
It is interesting to observe the different risk perceptions
etween sellers and buyers. The following case illustrates the
ase of a seller who, in his view, believed that there was “excess
f caution” from the buying side. The potential acquirer here
as a foreign investor:
“The  merger  was  clearly  a  win-win  proposition  for  all  parts
involved. On  the  buying-side,  there  was  a  foreign  investor
and we  were  the  private  equity  fund  working  with  the  sellers,
a Brazilian  company.  The  buying-side  due  diligence  advisors
4  de Ad
O
C
r
f
o
i
b
t
b
o
t
c
l
h
v
s
d
i
t
t
D
d
M
1
c
i
a
s
s
m
m
i
d
w
a
i
w
D
c
w
t
o
D
w76 A.C. Sales, M.T. Zanini / Revista
informed  their  client  about  potential  tax  risks.  They  took  the
opinion of  the  advisors  in  a  very  strict  way,  differently  from
what we  are  used  to  see  in  Brazil.  In  practice,  the  tax  risk
was very  low  or  almost  nonexistent.  Particularly  because
the sellers  offered  the  ability  to  adjust  the  “risk”  through  a
deposit in  an  escrow  account,  an  attitude  totally  “pro  deal”!
The advisors  certainly  had  a decisive  inﬂuence  on  the  deal
to be abandoned.  In  my  view,  the  attitude  of  advisor  was  the
worst possible,  clearly,  he  wanted  to  get  rid  of  the  problem.
The advisor  simply  preferred  to  say  that  the  risk  was  high  and
the buyer  dropped  the  deal.  What  a  shame  for  the  investor
because a few  months  after  the  negotiation  the  risk  actually
never materialized  and  a great  opportunity  was  lost.  The
company  has  been  delivering  a  result  above  the  forecasted
business plan.” (B3, Buyer/Seller, Deal Management)
ther  considerations
ultural  aspects  and  other  soft  underestimated  issues
The interviewees did not see cultural aspects as important
isks for deal making, except when cultural issues were mani-
ested in questionable corporate practices.
“Cultural  aspects  are  taken  more  seriously  in  developed
markets. For  example,  in  those  markets,  we  do  integration
planning as  part  of the  due  diligence  process  and  one  of  the
things we  analyze  is  ‘cultural  ﬁt’.  I  have  been  working  in
Brazil for  two  years  now  and  I  haven’t  seen  cultural  issues
being taken  into  consideration  for  closing  a  deal.  It  is  only
analyzed after  the  transaction  is  closed  and  the  companies
have to integrate  their  operations.  In  Brazil,  people  are  much
more worried  about  numbers,  synergies,  operations  and  the
infrastructure  to  support  the  business.  I  think  it  is  part  of  the
stage we  are  in.  As  the  M&A  industry  evolves,  we  will  get
there.” (A10, Advisor, Integration)
Haspeslagh and Jemison (1990) analyzed the cultural aspects
f deal making and stated that managers may not always have
nformation to judge how different cultures and subcultures in
oth organizations are, before they experience those differences
hemselves. They suggest an early focus on the strategic capa-
ilities that need to be preserved, on to what extent they depend
n keeping a cultural difference and can be held in a sub-part of
he organizational focus.
In other words, value creation, in its various forms (size,
ustomers, markets, synergies, competences), may be directly
inked to cultural aspects. Losing these skills may potentially
ave a reasonable impact on the ability to find the potential
alue to be created by the merger. Therefore, the cultural issues
hould not be underestimated, but should be factored into the
ecision-making process, along with other quantitative or qual-
tative issues.
Investors trying to enter Brazil may accept to pay extra money.
According to the interview program, foreign investors trying
o enter Brazil seem to be willing to pay a higher price when
hey are compared to domestic players:
i
f
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“Every  time  a foreign  investor  is  willing  to  pay  more  than
what the  valuation  says  it  is  justiﬁable  by  the  word  ‘strate-
gic’. ‘It’s  a strategic  investment’,  they  say.  As  a valuation
professional, I  have  to  accept  the  fact  that  these  buyers  are
seeing something  more  than  just  the  numbers  we  present  to
them.” (A3, Advisor, Deal management)
“I have  seen  a number  of  transactions  where  foreign  investors
have a  mandate  to  enter  Brazil  and  they  will  pay  as  much  as
the target  asks  for.  Sometimes  they  accept  a  ridiculous  price.”
(A5, Advisor, Due diligence)
“Private  Equity  investors  are  very  conscious  about  the  price
they are  paying  and  they  are  just  the  opposite  of some  eccen-
tric foreign  investors.  Price  equity  tend  to  try  paying  less  than
the fair  price.  They  are  clever  investors  and  their  focus  lies  on
the short-term.  Strategic  investors  tend  to  think  in  the  long-
term. Their  decision-making  process  is  based  on  the  next  ten
to twenty  years,  not  on  the  next  ﬁve  years.” (A1, Advisor,
Strategy/BD)
“For our  HQ,  it  was  important  to  expand  into  Brazil  and
we believed  it  was  possible  to  turnaround  the  business  and
bring synergies  and  new  products  to  conquer  the  Brazil-
ian market.  The  acquisition  was  just  a  platform  for  further
consolidation.” (B1, Buyer/Seller, Strategy/BD)
eal fever  is  a  powerful  force  and  may  bring  irrationality  to
eal making
Liu and Taffler (1998) studied CEOs’ overconfidence in
&A decision making by analyzing a sample composed of
900 transactions and data from more than 3100 CEOs. They
oncluded that CEO overconfidence has significantly negative
mpact on both short- and long-term post-M&A performance,
nd it corroborates Bing’s hypothesis.
McSweeney and Happonen (2012) state that commitment,
ecrecy and intense concentration, as well as pressure from out-
ide advisors can create a situation where the acquisition team
ay feel unable to stop the process or to slow its tempo, thus
aking the No-deal phenomenon unlikely to manifest. Accord-
ng to these authors, this phenomenon can lead to escalading
esires, to quick process completion and to ‘close the deal’,
hich also leads to overvaluation and inadequate considerations
bout integration issues.
The idea that the transaction momentum  is hard to resist to
s also supported by Cullinan, Le Roux, and Weddinger (2004),
ho corroborate such statement by exemplifying the case of the
ominicks’ acquisition by Safeway (a leading American gro-
ery chain) in 1998. The deal was closed in a hurry, within five
eeks, which was approximately a third of the mean closing
ime for large transactions. This swift transaction was based
n Safeway CEO’s confidence on his own capacity to increase
ominick’s operating margin from 7.5% to 9.5%, although Safe-
ay was operating at 8.4% only.
On the strategic side, the deal proved to be unfitting. Accord-
ng to Cullinan et al. (2004), Dominick’s focus on prepared
ood, on in-store cafes, and on product variety did not fit Safe-
ay’s emphasis on store brands and cost discipline. Dominick’s
A.C. Sales, M.T. Zanini / Revista de Ad
Table 3
Key findings.
Issue Summary observations
Typical roles
played in a
transaction
Usually, there are two main actors in a deal:
“buyer” and “seller”. These actors are supported
by a team of advisors or consultants who work in
the pre-deal, on-going deal and post-deal stages.
Usual deal flow The usual deal flow starts with (i) strategy
formulation, which is followed by the (ii)
identification of an acquisition target (from a
buyer’s perspective) or investor (from a seller’s
perspective), (iii) deal validation/evaluation, (iv)
structuring, (v) integration planning and (vi)
post-deal consolidation/stabilization.
Determination of
the most usual
merger talk
collapse points
Merger talks usually collapse in some point
between deal validation and structuring,
particularly after the due diligence and before
setting the agreement terms and conditions of
the deal. “It is during the due diligence, when
information is exchanged, that ‘skeletons in the
closet’ can be unveiled”.
Common factors
contributing to
deal collapses
The six main recurring topics have great
influence on deal breaking: (i) window dressing;
(ii) unrealistic expectations concerning the future
of the business and its value; (iii) Aggressive tax
planning and over engineered schemes to reduce
tax burden; (iv) lack of preparation resulting in
insufficient information during the due diligence
exercise; (v) interpretation disputes and failure
to reach an agreement on the adjustments
proposed for the due diligence; and (vi) general
lack of governance, informalities and
questionable corporate practices.
Price for walking
away from a
deal
Walking away from a deal can leave a bad taste
in the parts’ mouths. It is not rare to cause
frustration feelings, particularly in those who are
emotionally connected to the deal.
“Consequences can be disastrous” for deal
makers who let the “deal fever blind objectivity
or hijack reason”.
Other
considerations
Interviewees reported that cultural aspects in
Brazil are often more underestimated than in
developed markets. They also stated that
investors trying to enter Brazil might accept to
pay a higher price than domestic investors.
Finally, overconfidence is commonly referred to
as “deal fever” (in the M&A jargon), because it
manifests as a contrary force pushing for deal
completion and potentially leads to
overvaluation and inadequate considerations of
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trong unions resisted Safeway’s aggressive cost-cutting plans.
ecause Dominick’s customers were unwilling to accept Safe-
ay’s private label goods, Dominick’s was soon losing share
o its archrival, Jewel. Therefore, Safeway was not able to sell
ominick for even one fifth of the original purchase price.
According to Cullinan et al. (2004), a proper due diligence
rocess was followed and the risks were well-studied by Safe-
ay. The company would have possibly been able to detect
otential dangers and to quantify some of the problems man-
fested after the deal was closed. In other words, the proper due
iligence would have given elements for Safeway to walk away
i
wministração 52 (2017) 467–478 477
rom the deal. Table 3 shows a summary of the key findings in
he current study by analyzing those interviews and the most
elevant points to the herein presented problem.
onclusions
According to Gole and Hilger (2009), there are two circum-
tances leading to deal-failures: when the transaction presents
n unacceptable level of risk or when its value-creation plan is
ased on seriously flawed assumptions or both.
Horn, Lovallo, and Viguerie (2006) state that, although the
anceling of a project or exiting business may be often regarded
o as a sign of failure, such moves are perfectly normal parts of
reative-destruction processes. Actually, the unaccepted alter-
ative lies on gambling away the company’s resources on
ndeavors likely to fail in the long run, regardless of the invested
mount.
Based on the exploratory interview program conducted to
upport the present qualitative research, the present study gave
ix contributions to the M&A literature, particularly to the
razilian transaction context. First, issues contributing to merger
alk collapses such as window dressing, unrealistic expectations
egarding business valuation, tax-related risks, lack of infor-
ation (or preparation), failure to agree on the adjustments
roposed for the due diligence, general lack of governance,
nformalities and questionable corporate practices were iden-
ified, as it can be seen in Table 2.
Second, qualitative issues can be as destructive for merger
alks as valuation issues such as tax risks, contingencies, quality
f earnings and other liabilities. Third, the feeling of active deal
akers in Brazil about foreign investors, who tend to be stricter
o qualitative issues, was captured; domestic buyers tended to
e more flexible and complacent.
Fourth, according to the present results, the existing powerful
ounter-force, – which is commonly referred to as ‘deal fever’
y practitioners, was acknowledged as a form of overconfidence
ble to override rational decisions about mergers and acquisi-
ions. Fifth, it was also possible to conclude that merger talks
ften collapse at (or right after) the due diligence phase.
The last contribution regards the Brazilian bureaucracy,
hich, apparently, is complex and imposes high tax burden, fact
hat may be an important informality driver, as well as regards
he adoption of non-orthodox tax practices, particularly on the
amily-owned business environment.
When it comes to the main herein addressed questions, inter-
iew data supporting the findings and conclusions also provided
aluable insights about each factor driving merger talks collapse,
s well as opened up new potential areas for future research. It
s possible stating that “lack of professionalism”, on one or on
oth sides, is potentially the only common factor driving the risk
f reaching an unacceptable level. Moreover, it is an important
ondition allowing the use of flawed assumptions to create a
alse portrait of value by critically analyzing the six main issuesNowadays, based on the conducted interview program, it
s important emphasizing that deal makers who are actively
orking in Brazil do not report issues such as macroeconomic
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onditions, political and social environment or market as deter-
inant factors contributing to deal making failures. Such issues
an be treated through relatively objective approaches and fac-
ored into the valuation model. Additionally, these factors are
otentially evaluated upfront at the strategy formulation phase
r at the target identification phase, since they are external to the
eal.
The M&A process demands time and often encompasses an
cknowledged ritual between the parties. This ritual could be
omparable to human relationships to some extent; for example,
or a man or woman who just met each other, it is difficult to ask
or a background check, credit report, and about psychological,
ehavioral or medical opinions when they are still in the flirting
tage.
Therefore, it is recommended that companies seeking to
ngage in merger talks, particularly those trying to attract
nvestors, to get prepared before entering in serious negotiations.
reparation is herein understood as improving corporate gover-
ance; resolving informalities, challengeable tax practices and
vidences of questionable corporate acts and window dressing
echanisms.
Thus, hiring specialized external professional advice may be
he proper solution. Certain issues are not fixable from one day
o another (for example, certain tax risks need at least five years
o disappear). However, companies contemplating M&A should
ot wait for a due diligence exercise conducted by a counterpart,
ecause it would expose their internal problems. Instead of let-
ing the deal collapse, these companies should start considering
o become more professional.
On the other hand, investors should apply all the mecha-
isms available to identify certain issues that could potentially
ead to deal making failure upfront, before engaging in seri-
us negotiations. These issues should be raised according to a
hased approach or through a pre-deal fast track due diligence
greed with the counterpart. This diligence could avoid spending
 tremendous amount of money, time and resources in merger
alks that are doomed to fail.
Finally, deal makers should have Scott Neustadter’s cynical
dvice [(500) Days of Summer] in mind: some people are meant
o fall in love with each other.  .  . but they are not meant to be
ogether.
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